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SACRED SITE FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS ON
GOVERNMENT LAND: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
.SLIGHTING OF INDIAN RELIGIONS
JEFF FISH*

I. INTRODUCTION
First there were Indian tribes on this land, then the United States
Government. But now the government owns much of the land,
though it encompasses ground still considered sacred by Indian
religions. Recently, government development on these lands has conflicted with the first amendment protected religious practices of
Indians.' Some of these conflicts have resulted in skiers criss-crossing
sacred peaks 2 or lumber trucks rumbling through venerated highlands
where Indian priests traditionally meditated in pristine beauty.3 All
of these conflicts have resulted in Indian claims that have, in the
end, been denied. 4 The latest of these cases, Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association,' involved the most sacred
ground known to a group of northwestern California tribes. The
United States Supreme Court denied these Indians' claims and, in
doing so, virtually guaranteed failure for futuie Indian sacred site
6
claims.
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1. Indian religious practices, as well as the entire traditional Indian lifestyle, relate closely
with the land and other aspects of the environment. This relationship intertwines many Indian
religious practices with the sites in which they are performed:
Native American thought is inclined to employ spatial metaphors to describe
the unity of everything in the cosmos. "Once this spiritual vision of the
cosmos is recognized," historian Donald J. Hughes has commented, "the
Indian attitude toward the land itself becomes understandable. The land was
the gift of the domain of powerful beings. Certain locations, such as mountains
and lakes, served as especially important points of contact with these spirits
or forces." These places became shrines, exceptional places of power. The
Indians' relationship to the world is thus structured by sacred geography.
HIOhWATER, THt PRnML MiND, VtsION AND REALm iN INDMAN AMElUCA (1981) 127.
2. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
3. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
4. The following is a list of Indian free exercise claims that have been heard by federal
courts: Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1319; Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Wilson,
708 F.2d 735; Sequoyah v. Tenn. valley Auth.. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Crow v.
Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F. Supp.
182 (D. Alaska 1982).
5. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
6. See infra Part V, discussing Lyng and its possible repercussions.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

To support their sacred site free exercise claims under the first
amendment, Indian plaintiffs have been required by courts to show
that their religious practices were somehow burdened by a government
activity.7 Whether the plaintiffs have shown this burden appears as
the primary issue in sacred site cases and has been the basis for
the plaintiffs' defeat in almost all Indian sacred site claims on
government land. 8 This requirement of showing a burden on religious
practices remained the central question in sacred site cases until
Lyng, and lower courts struggled with what tests to apply when
deciding whether the government activity in a case actually burdened
the Indians' religious practices.
Thus, the question of what it means to place a burden on free
exercise of Indian religion has become a central issue in sacred site
cases. To address this question, lower courts developed the centrality
standard, 9 which required proof that the endangered activity is "central" and "indispensible" to the religion involved. 0 In Lyng, the
Supreme Court enunciated a new test to determine whether government activity places a constitutional burden on a religious practice;
the test requires that the government activity be coercive in nature."
A clear definition of the proper degree of proof needed to show
a burden on a religious practice has been elusive throughout the
history of free exercise analysis. On the surface, the primary question
involves how courts will decide whether a religious practice is burdened, and thus constitutionally protected. On a second level, however, another question emerges: Why have courts required the
standards of proof they have employed?
This article explores both of these questions by examining decisions
significantly affecting Indian sacred site claims on government land.
In addition, it discusses how courts have exaggerated and complicated
the burden requirement in free exercise analysis in a series of sacred
site cases. First, the article gives an overview of the Supreme Court's
analysis of the free exercise of religion under the first amendment.
Next, it considers significant Indian sacred site free exercise cases
that develop and apply the centrality standard for proof of a governmental burden on Indians' religious practices. Third, the article
considers the emergence of a new test based on a government coercion

7. This has been required by all federal courts hearing sacred site claims in order for

the claims to receive first amendment protection. See supra note 4.
8. All Indians bringing sacred site cases cited in this article have failed to prove that a
burden had been placed on their religious practices by government activity except for the
Navajo plaintiff in Badoni, supra note 4, whose claim was defeated on other grounds. See
infra note 77.
9. The "centrality standard" was originally coined in Cohen, American Indian Sacred
Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional Analysis in an Unconventional
Setting, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 770, 778 (1987).
10. See infra Part III for a discussion of the centrality standard.
11. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326-27.
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theory 2 which the Supreme Court applied in Lyng. Finally, the
article discusses the lower court decisions that led to the Supreme
Court decision in Lyng and explores the potential repercussions of
Lyng.
II. THE ANALYSIS OF FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
Prior to Lyng, the United States Supreme Court developed some
basic tenets to analyze claims under the free exercise clause of the
first amendment. 3 Put simply, the litigant must first show that his
or her first amendment right to free exercise of religion is at stake.
To do this, the litigant must demonstrate that a government action
burdens or impedes an authentic religious activity.'4 Once first amendment protection has been invoked by a showing that a litigant's
free exercise right is at stake, the Court examines the government's
justification for its activity.' 5 The government must show that it has
a compelling interest in continuing the activity, an interest
compelling
6
enough to override the free exercise right involved.'
In Sherbert v. Verner, 7 the Court determined that the government
must have a compelling interest to justify substantial infringement
of a first amendment right. 8 In Sherbert, the state of South Carolina
showed no compelling interest that allowed it to keep unemployment
compensation from a Seventh-day Adventist who was fired and could
not find other work because she refused to work on Saturdays, her
Sabbath. Since the government violated her free exercise rights without a compelling state interest, the Court allowed the appellant to
receive her unemployment benefits.' 9 The Court found that "to
condition the availability of benefits upon this . . . cardinal principle

12. See infra Part V which discusses the development of a penalty theory similar to the
government coercion theory applied in Lyng.
13. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (government cannot regulate religious
beliefs); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (government cannot compel affirmation
of a repugnant belief); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1952) (government cannot
penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups holding religious views repugnant to
authorities).
14. See infra Part I, which discusses the free exercise clause analysis outlined by the
Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. "We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility
provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's
First Amendment right. It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, 'only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."'
374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). See also Thomas
v. Review Board, Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment
benefits to Jehovah's Witness who refused to build tanks; claim upheld) and Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 107 S. Ct. 1046. 1051, n.9 (1987) (denial of
unemployment benefits to Seventh-day Adventist refusing to work on Saturdays; claim upheld).
19. 374 U.S. at 410.
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of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her

constitutional liberties. "20

The majority's discussion of obstructing a cardinal principle of
faith illustrated that a burden was clearly placed on the appellant's
religious practices. Justice Douglas, concurring in Sherbert, however,
argued strongly that every aspect of religious practice is to be
untouched by interference unless a compelling state interest can be
shown. He wrote, "The . . . government cannot exact from me a
surrender of one iota of my religious scruples [without a compelling
state interest]. '"21 But since the majority's opinion did not mention
a necessary degree of importance for the religious practice, the
question of whether the first amendment covered all religious practices endangered by any kind of government activity remained unsettled. Although Sherbert held that cardinal religious principles must
be protected under the first amendment, the case did not state that
a religious practice must be a cardinal principle of the religion in
order for it to be constitutionally protected.
In 1972 the Supreme Court outlined other factors which define
whether a burden is placed on a religious practice. The landmark
case of Wisconsin v. Yoder2 concerned a community adhering to
the Amish faith who would not allow their children to attend public
schools past the eighth grade. The Amish claimed that state-sponsored
education inculcated values in their children which were contrary to
values of the Amish faith. The Court found that the state's compulsory education law burdened the religion of the Amish community
and that the government's interests did not override the religious
practices and lifestyle at stake." The Court decided that the Amish
lived in such a way that the lifestyle itself was'part of an organized
religion shared by an organized group, not just a matter of personal
preference.2 4 Moreover, the Court determined that requiring education
beyond the eighth grade substantially interfered with daily living
intimately related to a deep religious conviction.2S The Court also
pointed out that the interference, compulsory secondary schooling,
was a very real threat to the continuing practice of religion in the
Amish community, and would ". . . endanger their own salvation
26
and that of their children" by complying with the law.
The Court in Yoder also considered the sincerity of the belief
accompanying the practice. Rather than examining the underlying
values of the Amish religion, the Court looked to the sincerity of

20. Id. at 406.
21. Id. at 412.

22. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

221.
217-18.
215.
209.
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the practicing believers. 2 The Amish's sincere belief that their religion
requires their lifestyle, as well as their honest conviction in their
religious practices, stand out as reasons why the Court placed2 the
Amish lifestyle as a whole under first amendment protection.
Once the Court established that an actual religious practice existed
and involved the Amish's entire lifestyle, the Court focused on
whether the government action placed any burden on that practice/
lifestyle. Discussing the possible impact of the state regulation on
the Amish religion and the perpetuation of the Amish community
and culture, the Court found that secondary education did indeed
burden the Amish religion.? The Court did not define a specific
practice burdened by the continuing education of Amish children,
but instead cited the broad effect compulsory education would have
on Amish lifestyle and culture that necessarily intertwine with Amish
religion. The court stated:
Almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of
a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents' entire
mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the state's
requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth
grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise
of respondents' religious beliefs. 0
With this statement the Court identified the Amish's religious
practices as heavily burdened by the government activity of compulsory secondary education. By giving the Amish's protected rights
their appropriate weight, the Court recognized the value the Amish
placed on their own religious practices which they considered inseparable from their lifestyle. This analysis, giving full credit to the
values of believers once a sincere belief is established, should be
kept in mind during the weighing of religious rights at stake in
Indian sacred site claims.. Only after examining the plaintiffs' religious
claims did the Court in Yoder consider the other side of the balance,
the government's interests in education past the eighth grade. While
the Court found the government's interests to be important, the
Court decided that the Amish's first amendment rights were still
more important. 3
Thus, in Yoder the Court first found an actual religious practice
in Amish lifestyle and found that the first amendment protected this
religious practice because it was rooted in sincere belief.3 2 Next, the
Court determined that the religious practice was endangered, or

27. Id.at 235.
28. Id. This determination closely parallels the qualification that Indian litigants seek in
their sacred site claims. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
29. Id. at 218.
30. Id. at 219.
31. Id. at 221-22.
32. Id. at 235.
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burdened, by government activity." Finally, after finding a burdened
religious activity protected by the free exercise clause, the Court
balanced the importance of the religious rights at risk and the
government interest involved. 4 In so doing the Court in Yoder
delineated in clear terms the appropriate free exercise clause analysis
when religious practice is inseparable from lifestyle and culture."
The Yoder analysis thus consists of three parts: first, whether the
religious practices involved are protected by the first amendment
(i.e., whether the practice is rooted in sincere religious belief); second,
whether the protected practice is burdened by government activity
(i.e., whether the government activity endangers the continuation of
the religious activity); and third, whether the burdened religious right
outweighs the government's interest. Since Yoder, the requirement
of showing a burden on Indians' religious practices has become the
major stumbling block for litigants making sacred site free exercise
claims .36
In the sacred site case law which evolved after Yoder most lower
courts found Yoder to be controlling.37 Indian litigants rarely have
reached the third part of the Yoder analysis, the balancing test. 8
Instead, the major question in these cases has been whether any
unconstitutional burden has been placed on Indian religious practices
at all.3 9 Because of this, the definition of what constitutes a burden
on religious practices has become a crucial question. The Court in
Yoder stated that a burden on religious practice ". . . would gravely
endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious
beliefs, '"40 and in Sherbert it found the burden to be a penalty,
making the believer choose whether to "violate a cardinal principle
of her religious faith" in order to get unemployment benefits.4' In
both instances, the infringed religious practices clearly qualify for
protection, yet in neither case does the Court directly address the
question of what kind of burden is necessary or how important the
religious practice must be in order to qualify as being unconstitutionally burdened.

33. Id. at 218.
34. Id. at 221.
35. Id. at 219.
36. See, eg., Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1319; Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
37. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1159; Crow
v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982). These case cite Yoder as precedent for free
exercise analysis. Wilson remains the only lower federal court decision involving a sacred site
claim that does not cite Yoder for proper free exercise analysis.
38. Badoni is the only case that reaches the balancing test, the final part of the free
exercise analysis set out in Yoder.
39. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1319; Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.
1980); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735; Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982);
Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982).
40. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
41. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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III. THE CENTRALITY STANDARD
Although Yoder unquestionably remained as precedent to lower
courts in sacred site free exercise cases, the question of exactly how
to define a burden remained unclear. To resolve this question, the
lower courts introduced and applied a new standard, the centrality
standard. However, whether this standard logically flowed from
Yoder and Sherbert raises additional questions.
The case in which the centrality standard first emerged came from
the Supreme Court of Alaska and did not involve a sacred site; it
involved a moose. Frank v. State 2 concerned the Athabascan Indians
and a religious ceremony known as the "funeral potlatch. 4' 3 During
the potlatch friends and relatives gather at the home village of a
deceased in the tribe and have a feast in honor of the deceased."
The dead tribal member is not considered to have left the earth
until his friends and relatives have one last communal feast "with"

him .4
In Frank, a tribal member killed a moose for a funeral potlach
and brought it back to the village to be made part of the feast."
The state prosecuted the hunter since moose hunting season was
over. 47 The Alaska Supreme Court discussed the foods which were
available for such a potlach and whether moose was necessary for
the ceremony." After an extensive evidentiary hearing, 49 the court
determined that the "absolute necessity" of a practice to a religion
is too strict a standard to judge whether a practice is an actual
religious practice protected by the first amendment.10 The court relied
on Yoder in deciding that whether a claimant holds a deeply rooted
religious belief is the proper standard to determine whether a religious
practice is constitutionally protected."
In order to determine whether the government regulation burdened
Athabascan religious practice, the court examined how severely the
government's hunting regulations infringed upon the religious practice. 2 The lower court had found that moose meat was not absolutely
necessary for the funeral potlach, and therefore restrictive hunting
of the moose did not affect the ceremony." The testimony of
Athabascans, however, showed that moose meat was an important

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1072-73.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1069, 1072.
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part of a proper funeral potlach because moose is the most important
and highly valued meat in Athabascan lifeY4
In Indian religion cases it is especially important for a court to
understand the many aspects of a religion, including those which
may intertwine religion with lifestyle. Giving credence to the sincere
belief of religious practitioners means accepting the boundaries of
a religion as its adherents see it and accepting the significance given
to each facet of religious practice. In Yoder, this definition determined whether the government activity actually placed a burden on
the religious practice." Because Indian religions are often drastically
different from more commonly practiced religions in American society, non-Indian judges need to consider carefully the religious
practices at issue to understand fully their import.
In Frank, a funeral potlach could go on without moose meat,
but it would not have the full significance of a potlach with moose
meat. Athabascans
testified that a potlach just isn't a potlach without
6
moose meat.

The Supreme Court of Alaska in Frank recognized this and expended the necessary time and effort to discover the full impact of
a funeral potlach without moose, while still not judging the values
of the religion involved. After weighing the Indians' religious interests
at stake, the court, in its balancing test, determined that the state's
interest in a healthy moose population, though compelling, was not
harmed to a significant extent and therefore did not outweigh the
Indians' first amendment freedoms."
Although the Alaska Supreme Court in Frank conducted its analysis in accordance with Yoder, later lower court sacred site cases
do not exactly follow the analysis set forth in the first two parts
of the Yoder test." Instead, these lower court sacred site cases seem
to follow the analysis suggested by the dissent in the Frank case.
There, Justice Connor argued that use of moose meat in the funeral
potlach must rise ". . . to the level of a cardinal religious principle,
[and] unless it is central to a religious observance, it cannot qualify
as a practice protected by the 'free exercise' clauses of either the
state or federal constitutions."5 9 Justice Connor cited Yoder and
Sherbert as requiring that the religious practice be a central or
cardinal religious principle or practice. However, neither of these
two cases set down the requirement that a particular practice involve

54. Id. at 1073.
55. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
56. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1072.
57. Id. at 1074.
58. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d
172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Crow
v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
59. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1076 (citing Yoder and Sherbert).
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a central religious principle. Instead, the majority opinions remained
silent on this point, while Justice Douglas, concurring in Sherbert,
urged that any infringement of actual religious practices is a burden
on those practices. 60
Justice Connor of the Alaskan Supreme Court, in his dissent,
claimed that moose meat should be required to be "necessary,"
"indispensible," "cardinal," and "central" to be protected by the
first amendment. 6' In doing so he implied that moose meat is not
"central" to a potlatch and therefore interpreted the values of the
Athabascan religion himself, rather than listening to the Athabascans.
By lending no credence to the values held by the religious practitioners
themselves, Justice Connor made the question of whether the practice
was burdened by government activity one essentially for himself to
determine, relying on his own evaluation of how the government's
actions affected the religious practice. Instead of following Yoder,
Justice Connor convoluted both the first and second parts of the
Yoder analysis, turning them into determinations based on a judge's
own system of values.
With Justice Connor's dissent in Frank, the centrality standard
was born. Other courts were soon to elaborate on it.62 Nevertheless,
the centrality standard has no true roots in Yoder or Sherbert even
though Justice Connor cites these cases as the source of his dissent.
In fact, by creating a requirement that an endangered religious
practice be "central" to a religion in order to demonstrate that
government activity burdens the religion, a court would require that
the religion prove itself legitimate in the eyes of the court once
again, after a practice has been found to be rooted in sincere religious
belief. Requiring that religious believers show that a practice is
"central" for there to be a burden, in addition to its being rooted
in sincere religious belief, means that an extra hurdle is erected in
order for a religious practice to qualify for constitutional protection.
If the centrality standard is not applied, the burden to a religious
practice must still outweigh the government interests for it to survive
the balancing test. If a religious practice is insignificant, then it will
be given little weight in the balance in comparison with any compelling government interest. The additional hurdle added to free
exercise analysis, the centrality standard, became entrenched in later
circuit court cases dealing with free exercise analysis of Indian sacred
site claims on government land.
In 1980 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals announced the first
majority opinion which included the additional requirement that a

60.
61.
62.
Crow,

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412.
Frank, 604 P.2d at 1075-76.
See Badoni, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980);
541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
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religious practice be central to a religion in order to pass muster
under free exercise scrutiny. In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,6 Cherokee Indians wanted construction of the Tellico Dam
stopped because the flooding caused by the dam would burden their
free exercise of religion. 64 The Cherokees believed that flooding the
river valley, which the Ketooah and Eastern Cherokees consider their
sacred homeland, would damage their religion.65 The Indians' complaint stated that "[d]estruction of sacred sites, medicine gathering
sites, holy places and cemeteries, will disturb the sacred balance of
the land." 66 Two Cherokee medicine men testified that they gathered
sacred herbs found in no place except the valley and that they
derived their spiritual power from the valley. 6' One medicine man
testified that he would lose his knowledge of medicine if the valley
were flooded, and another stated that the flooding would "destroy
the spiritual strength of the Cherokee people."68
Nevertheless, the court of appeals found that the flooding of the
Little Tennessee Valley caused by the Tellico Dam would not cause
an "infringement of a constitutionally cognizable First Amendment
right" on the religious practices of the Cherokee people.6 9 In so
doing the Sequoyah court appears to have considered only the first
two parts of the free exercise test announced in Yoder. Since the
court decided that Cherokee religious practices were not burdened
by the flooding of their sacred homeland, the court did not need
to assess the government interests involved and weigh them against
the degree of damage that would have been done to the religious
practices.
A close reading of the court's opinion reveals that the court's
approach was already determined before it explicitly reached the free
exercise analysis. The court noted that construction of the Tellico
Dam was already underway. 70 Also, the court emphasized that the
Indian customs at stake were based more on "cultural heritage"
than religious belief. 7' In pointing these things out before it even
reached the free exercise analysis, the court implicitly balanced the
heavy interest of the government against its own version of Cherokee
religion. The court explained that the only evidence given for the
actual use of the area by the Cherokee was the visits of a few
medicine men. 72 But the testimony of these medicine men made it

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1162.
Id..
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
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clear that frequent visits by Cherokees were not necessary to make
the land a part of the religious practice of the Cherokee. Yet the
Sequoyah court found no burden on the Cherokees' religious practices
because those customs involving the flooded area were not central
to the Cherokee religion."
Sequoyah, and any other case employing the centrality standard
in a religious free exercise analysis, allow a court to critically examine
the worth of certain religious practices and, in its discretion, rank
the values of a religion. The centrality standard draws on the personal
values of each jurist rather than conceding the integrity of values
given to the practices by the religion's believers. Because the Sequoyah
court determined the Cherokee religious practices involved were not
central to the religion, the court found no burden on these practices.74
Thus, the dam which ended the existence of the snail darter 7 also
ended the existence of the religious practices of Cherokee medicine
men.
Sequoyah, however, did affirm some important principles necessary
for Indians to make successful free exercise claims regarding sacred
sites. First, although the court did not find the Cherokee religion
burdened, the Sequoyah court reiterated that religion need not be
76
orthodox or conventional to qualify for first amendment protection.
More significantly, the court stated that Indians do not need to
show a property interest in the sacred site in order to bring a first
amendment claim.7
When the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a sacred
site claim on United States park land in Crow v. Gullet,78 its ruling
allowed tourists to watch sacred ceremonies being performed by
Lakota and Tsistsistas Indians at Bear Butte, South Dakota. Bear
Butte, located in the Black Hills, "is the most significant site of
Lakota religious ceremonies . . . where the Lakota originally met
with the Great Spirit." 7 9 Even though the Indians in Crow contended
that park roads, parking lots, and tourist viewing platforms destroyed
the sanctity of the area, the court determined that the government
had placed no burden on the Lakota's religious practices. 0
The Eighth Circuit relied heavily on the district court's free exercise
analysis in the Crow case, giving a summary of the lower court's
opinion as virtually its own."' In that analysis the court used the
centrality standard established in Sequoyah. The district court stated

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1164-65.
Id.
Id. at 1161 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
Id. at 1063.
Id.at 1164.
706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 788 (D.S.D. 1982).
Crow, 706 F.2d at 858-59.
Id. at 858.
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that the Indians had "an insufficient showing of a burden . . .
[and] plaintiffs failed to show that the construction projects now
in progress, as well as the past development in the park, have
burdened any rights protected by the free exercise clause.' '82
The district court required the Indian plaintiffs to show that their
religious practices were indispensable, heightening the required showing of a burden.8 3 Although the Indians argued that allowing photography, food and water, and menstruating women at the site
offends the strict rules of the vision quest ceremony practiced there,
the court did not see these impediments as enough of a burden on
the religious practice because these tenets were not shown to be
indispensible to the religion.84 The court emphasized the fact that
access to the site had not been denied; since the Indians were on
the site, then it seemed to the court that they could perform their
ceremonies.ss Thus, no impermissible burden existed.8
By using the language "impermissibly burdened" the court drew
a distinction between a regular burden and an impermissible one.
However, the threshold question is not whether there is an impermissible burden on a religion, but whether there is a burden at all. 87
The Sequoyah court did not use the phrase "impermissibly burden,"
and the concept of an impermissible burden as contrasted with a
permissible one places a heightened burden on Indian free exercise
litigants when a court applies the centrality standard. In using that
standard, the district court in Crow, like the dissent in Frank, did
not accept the significance of the totality of the circumstances surrounding an Indian ceremony.
Another interesting facet of the district court's decision in Crow
arises in the court's discussion of whether the plaintiff's religious
practice is burdened by government activity." In that discussion, the
court asserts that there must be some "coercive effect" on the
religious practice, that somehow the government activity "compelled
citizens to violate the tenets of their religion," and that "plaintiffs
must establish they are being injured or penalized by their adherence
to the tenets of their religion." 8 9 The court seems to raise these
requirements as necessary in order for there to be proof that a
burden exists on a religious activity. The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals perpetuated this additional twist in discussions of burden
in sacred site cases with its opinion in Wilson v. Block. 9°

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id.
708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). One additional case from the Tenth Circuit, Badoni
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IV. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PENALTY THEORY
In Wilson, the Hopi and Navajo plaintiffs complained that ski
resort development in the San Francisco Peaks, specifically in an
area known as the Arizona Snow Bowl, was "grossly inconsistent
with their beliefs . . . [and] will lead to serious adverse consequences
for their peoples." 9 1 The Indians believed that the Peaks were sacred
and that gods live or are embodied in the Peaks. They further
believed that the Indians hold a sacred trust to keep the Peaks in
their natural condition and that any development would affront the
gods of the Peaks.Y
The chairman of the Hopi tribe elaborated on the perspective of
the Hopi concerning development of the unpaved road and thenexisting ski runs:
It is my opinion that in the long run if the expansion is permitted,
we will not be able successfully to teach our people that this is
a sacred place. If the ski resort remains or is expanded, our
people will not accept the view that this is the sacred Home of
the Kachinas. The basis of our existence as a society will become
a mere fairy tale to our people.93
The chairman made it clear that the sacredness of the Peaks and
their significance to the Hopi religion required a purity of the site
as it existed.
But, like the court in Crow, the Wilson court found that the
Indians did not demonstrate an impermissible burden on their religion, even though the court clearly described the Indians' belief
that severe damage will occur to their religious practices as a result
of the ski area.Y The threshold showing of a burden on religious
practice was again raised to a showing of an impermissible burden.95
Not only does the Wilson court stray from Yoder's threshold
showing, but it did not even mention the Yoder analysis. Instead,
Wilson relied heavily on Sherbert, as well as on Thomas v. Indiana

v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), evaluated the centrality of Navajo religious
practices but did not determine whether the practices were burdened. The plaintiffs claimed
that their first amendment rights were infringed because construction and use of the Glen
Canyon Dam and Reservoir were drowning their gods and denying them access to a sacred
prayer spot. Id. at 1760. The court balanced the Indians' claims against those of the government,
finding that the government's interest was compelling and "a crucial part of a multi-state
water storage and power generation project." Id. at 177. Because the dam and reservoir
were complete, the government's interest became much greater than if the project had not
yet been built. Although the court claimed that it relied on the Yoder analysis, it decided,
without finding a burden on Navajo religion, that continuing the water, power, and recreation
project outweighed the right of a centrally important holy place of a long-standing religion
to exist.
91. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id. at 741.
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Employment Review Board,96 a case involving unemployment benefits
denied for religious reasons. But Thomas and Sherbert are both free
exercise cases involving denial of public benefits. Unintentionally
highlighting this difference with Yoder, the Wilson court stated that
"many government actions may offend religious believers, and may
cast doubt upon the veracity of religious faith, but unless such
actions penalize faith, they do not burden religion." 97
This statement is surprising considering that the plaintiffs in Yoder
were not being penalized for being Amish, yet the Supreme Court
found that a burden had been placed on their religion. The statement
does indicate, however, that the Wilson court found a new way of
denying that any burden was placed on Indian religion, especially
when the wholeness of the surroundings to a ceremony are claimed
as important factors in the religious practice. The Wilson court, like
others before it, ignored the significance of all of the environmental
factors which can play a role in Indian religion. In doing so, it
developed the penalty theory for denying that the government places
any burden on Indian religion, the theory that if actions do not
penalize faith, they do not burden it.98
Yoder flatly contradicts this penalty theory of burden. The penalty
theory of a religious burden might have a valid application in those
situations involving benefits, cases such as Sherbert and Thomas,
but Indian sacred site cases are much more similar to Yoder. If an
action does not burden a religious practice unless it penalizes that
practice, as the penalty theory of the Wilson and Crow courts assert,
then not only are Indian sacred site claims to be denied, but the
government regulation in Yoder itself would not have constituted a
burden on religion. Similar to the way in which the Amish were
not penalized by compulsory education in Yoder, the Lakotas were
not penalized by construction of parking lots and viewing platforms
in Wilson. Nevertheless, although the Supreme Court found that
Amish religion was burdened in Yoder, under the penalty theory of
the Wilson court, the Indian plaintiffs were unable to establish a
burden. The idea that government activity must coerce or penalize
a religious practice for first amendment protection becomes a key
concept in the Supreme Court's decision in Lyng.
V. LYNG v. NORTHWEST INDIAN CEMETERY
PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION
Before the case arrived in the United States Supreme Court, Lyng
began in the Ninth Circuit, in the Northern District of California."

96. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
97. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 741.
98. Id.
99. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
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Unlike other federal district courts that examined Indian free exercise
sacred site claims, however, the Northern District of California
decided in favor of the Indians.' °° The Indians in Lyng, Yurok,
Karok, and Tolowa Indians residing in Northern California, based
their claim on potential infringements of their right to exercise certain
religious practices in a government-owned area known to the Indians
as "high country." The plaintiffs opposed the completion of a paved
road between Gasquet and Orleans, California (the "G-O road");
the final unpaved section goes through sacred land called "high
country." 0 '
Lyng can be distinguished from other sacred site cases on several
grounds. First, the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians brought the
case to court before construction of the road began. In Sequoyah,
Crow, and Wilson the government had completed or begun the
construction to which the Indians were opposed. In Lyng the Indians'
claim was more viable since they opposed interference with the sacred
site from the start of the perceived threat. 02
Another difference which distinguishes Lyng from other sacred
site cases appears in the form of a government document which
supported the Indians' claims in terms the court understood. The
district court relied heavily on a report prepared for the Forest
Service by Dr. Dorothea Theodoratus which described the religious
practices of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa in the high country and
the effects that different road route proposals would have on those
practices. 03 The report concluded that completion of the road would
"produce an irreparable impact on the spiritual and physical wellbeing of the adjacent Yurok, Karok and Tolowa communities"
°
because of the degradation of religious practices in the area. 0
The Theodoratus Report concluded that degradation of the practices would result from the road because the road would: 1) "damage
the pristine visual conditions . . . essential for its religious use"; 05
2) "impair the success of religious and medicinal quests . . . [because
of] increased aural disturbances";' °0 3) "erode the religious significance of the areas . . . [by degradation of the environment]"; 0 7
4) impair religious use of the area because of increasing recreational
use; and 5) all these combined factors would spoil the solitude of
the religious practices.' 08

100. Id. at 606.
101. id. at 590-91.
102. Id. at 592.

103. Id. (citing TmEDoiuTus. CuLTuRALRrasoURCES OF THE

CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION,
asT-O.ANs ROAD, Six RirvEts N^TONAL FOREST (known as the Theodoratus Report)).
104. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir.
1986).
105. 565 F. Supp. at 592.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 594.
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These conclusions of the Theodoratus Report bolstered the Indian
claims. Since the Report was commissioned by the Forest Service,
it was in essence an admission of a party opponent to the validity
of the Indian claims.'01 Because it came from a source other than
the plaintiffs, the court could examine the report as an objective
critique." 0 While government environmental impact statements were
mentioned in other sacred site cases,"' they did not bear directly
on the validity of the free exercise claims themselves. Because the
Theodoratus Report described both cultural and religious impact,
the report directly supported the Indians' claims that not only their
culture but also their religion would be damaged by the completion
of the G-O Road. The Forest Service, by commissioning the report,
demonstrated proper concern for the effects of the road on Indian
culture and religion
as required by the American Indian Religious
2
Freedom Act. "

Perhaps because of the added supportive information, the district
court found that the Indians demonstrated a burden on their religious
practices by proving the government infringement threatened an
indispensible part of their religion." 3 The court stated that since it
constitutes the center of the spiritual world . . . [for the
Indians] the high country is 'central and indispensible' to the Indian
plaintiffs' religion.""

4

This holding is the first and only time the

centrality standard has been met. With this threshold barrier overcome, the court found that "the proposed Forest Service actions
impose an unlawful burden on the free exercise of plaintiffs' religion. ""' Balancing the religious and government interests in the
case, the court determined that the completion of the G-O Road
was not compelling enough to endanger the religious practices of
6
the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's opinion." 7 The court of appeals agreed that the
plaintiffs' free exercise rights were burdened, but the court was
careful to consider whether the government activity threatened to
seriously interfere with central and indispensible religious practices

109. Id. at 595.
110. Most likely, it will benefit future Indian litigants with similar claims to rely on this
kind of sociological and anthropological critique from a third party to back up their claims
and verify the significance of the endangered practices in their complete form.
111. E.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
113. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 594.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 595.
116. Id. at 596.
117. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985);
the lower court was reaffirmed on rehearing, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986) (in light of
enactment of California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984),
signed after argument of the first case).

Winter 1990]

SACRED SITE FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS

and beliefs on the only site where they could be performed.",, The
court of appeals expressed caution in its opinion, making sure the
standards it set down for free exercise protection were high." '9
The United States Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals,
refused to apply the centrality standard set out so methodically in
Sequoyah, Crow, and Wilson. The Court resolved the burden question in another way. Hearkening back to the analysis in Wilson,
the Supreme Court decided that in order for a government activity
to burden a religion, the activity must be coercive to the religious
practitioners involved. 120 In addition, only coercive activities that do
not involve the government's
own internal affairs will be considered
2
burdensome to religion.' '

While the Supreme Court set out a complete framework for free
exercise analysis in Yoder, later federal courts debated about what
exactly was needed to show that a government activity burdens a
religious practice.'2 Federal courts developed the centrality standard
for determining whether a burden exists, requiring Indian plaintiffs
to show that the religious practice in question was central or indispensible to their religion. 23 By not applying the centrality standard,
the Supreme Court in Lyng cast this test aside and established a
new method for determining whether a government activity burdens
a religion. In Lyng the Court focused in another way on whether
the proposed government activity creates a sufficiently heavy burden
to violate the free exercise clause.' 2 4
While the majority in Lyng did not cite Yoder except to state
that the plaintiffs and the dissent misinterpreted it, 125 the majority
stayed within the basic framework of free exercise analysis established
in Yoder by examining whether a burden exists and determining the
nature of the government's competing interest. 26 At the outset of
its free exercise analysis, the majority stated, "It is undisputed that
the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere and that the Government's
proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of
their religion."' 27 Thus, the majority agreed that the Indians did
have an authentic religious practice at stake, applying the first part
of the Yoder analysis. Also, the majority admitted that the government activity endangered those religious practices.

118. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693.
119. Id.
120. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325.
121. Id.
122. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
123. See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d at 1159.
124. 108 S. Ct. at 1324-27.
123. Id. at 1329.
126. Id. at 1324-27.
127. Id. at 1324.
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To define the burden requirement the Court relied on two concepts:
internal governmental affairs and coercive government activity which
compels behavior.'n The first of these concepts was applied by the
Court to a free exercise claim in Bowen v. Roy. 29 In Roy the Court
used the term internal government procedure to refer to welfare
programs functioning through the social security system and found
that "Itihe Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to
require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways
that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens."' 30
In Lyng the Court accepted the existence of the realm of internal
government affairs but did not define it precisely. Instead, the Court
stated, "Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional
prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct
by government of its own affairs, the location of the line cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a government action on a religious
objector's spiritual development."'' It went on to hint at the breadth
of internal affairs when it stated that "[a] broad range of government
activities-from social welfare programs [such as those in Roy] to
foreign aid to conservation projects-. . . will always be essential2
3
to some person's spiritual well-being and repugnant to others."'
To more clearly delineate the realm of internal government affairs,
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court. in Lyng cited her concurrence in Roy for the need to distinguish "between the Government's use of information in its possession [internal affairs] and the
Government's requiring an individual to provide such information
[government compulsion]."'3
As well as internal government affairs, the Court also discussed
coercive government action. The Court compared Roy to Lyng,
pointing out the similarity of their claims. The Court stated: "In
neither case . . . would the affected individuals be coerced by the
government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would
either governmental action penalize religious activity by denying any
person an equal share of the rights, benefits and privileges enjoyed
by other citizens."'13 4 Thus, in deciding whether the Indians' religious
practice was burdened, the Court focused on any coercion or penalty
that results from the government activity.

128. Id. at 1325.
129. 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (Indian plaintiffs contended that their free exercise rights were
infringed by the use of a social security number for their daughter, Little Bird of the Snow;
they believed the social security number would rob her of her soul).
130. Id. at 699.

131.
this in
132.
133.

108 S. Ct. at 1326. This statement seems odd in that the Court apparently did exactly
Yoder.
Id. at 1327.
Id.

134. Id. at 1325.
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The concepts of government coercion and internal government
affairs join to form a schema for discovering which infringed religious
practices might fall under free exercise clause protection.'" The Court
in Lyng quoted Roy to capture this idea: '.. . . The Free Exercise
Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to
36
dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures.""11
Thus, the Court made it clear that the free exercise clause does not
require the government to change internal government activity. Therefore, the designation "internal government activity" acts as an apparently impenetrable veil around certain government functions.
The Court does not state whether any particular internal government activity might be coercive to religious practices. Rather, under
the Court's analysis, no activity would actually burden a religious
practice since all internal activities appear to be protected from free
exercise challenges. However, the Court also stated that only coercive
or penalizing activity by the government can burden a religious
practice.'" Thus, one could logically conclude that only coercive or
penalizing governmental activity not involving internal government
affairs can burden a religious practice in a proper free exercise
analysis.
This definition of burdening a religious practice substantially narrows the possible free exercise claims that litigants can successfully
bring against government activity. Under the logic of the Lyng
majority's analysis, the parents of Little Bird of the Snow lost their
case in Roy because their claim was precluded by the internal
government activity. Even if requiring a social security number were
coercive or could be interpreted as a penalty, the Court would still
protect internal government activities and not find a burden on the
religious practice. The Court seemed to believe that, as in Roy, the
religious practices in Lyng collided with internal government activities
protected from free exercise claims.' 38
In sum, the Court in Lyng appears to have employed a new test
for determining whether a government activity places a burden on
a religious practice. The test requires consideration of whether the
government's activities are internal and coercive. In order for a
burden to exist the government activity must be coercive, but not
involve internal affairs. If, on the other hand, the government activity
is internal, whether or not it is coercive, then the activity does not
burden the religious practice under the free exercise clause.

135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700).
137. Id.at 1325.
138. The Court stated: "Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area,
however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
land. Id. at 1327 (emphasis in original).
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While the majority never clearly enunciated a new free exercise
analysis, it described the two components, coerciveness and internal
government activity as guidelines to limit free exercise claims.' 3 9
Without explicitly stating as much, the Court in Lyng established
a free exercise analysis dependent on these principles. It seems
apparent that the Court, in revising its free exercise analysis, was
primarily concerned with the operation of government and the potential for increased litigation. The Court stated: "However much
we might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs
and desires."'1'4 The prospect of opening the floodgates of free
exercise litigation was a clear concern of the Court: ". . such
[Indian] beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial ownership
of some rather spacious tracts of public property. Even without
anticipating future cases, the diminution of the Government's property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian religion,
would in this case be far from trivial . . . . ",i,4 These concerns of
a deluge of free exercise litigation and loss of government property
rights, as well as the specter of establishment clause violations,
persuaded the Court to construct an opinion beyond the reaches of
formalistic free exercise analysis.
The majority relied on these policy considerations to guide its free
exercise analysis, reinforcing the view that, for Indian plaintiffs with
sacred site claims, the threshold question of whether a religious
practice is burdened exists only as a closed gateway. If the threshold
had been passed in Lyng, the outcome of the balancing test seems
clear. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, stated it well:
Today's ruling sacrifices a religion at least as old as the Nation
itself, along with the spiritual well-being of its approximately
5,000 adherents, so that the Forest Service can build a six-mile
segment of road that two lower courts found had only the most
marginal and speculative utility, both to the Government itself
and to the private lumber interests that might conceivably use
it. 142

VI. CONCLUSION
In Lyng, the Supreme Court enunciated a rule for determining
whether a government activity places a burden on a religious practice.
Only after plaintiffs with free exercise claims establish that they are
coerced by a government activity that is not part of the government's

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1327.
Id.
Id. at 1339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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internal affairs .cap, a court regard their religious practices as deserving
full first amendment protection. While the exact test for the proof
of a burden remains less than cleAr after Lyng, the effect the case
will have on future sacred site claims is-evjdent. Lyng sends a clear
signal that free exercise infringement claims on- .goyernment lands
will not likely receive redress.
Unless Congress specifically addresses the issue of Indian free
exercise rights at sacred sites on public lands, courts that follow
Lyng will probably not fully recognize Indian constitutional religious
rights on government property. Unless the government activity somehow actually targets Indians, it is unlikely that courts will find that
the government has burdened an Indian religion by activity conducted
on the government's own land. A court unreceptive to an Indian
claim will be able to consider that any government activity on
government land fails under the internal affairs distinction promulgated in Lyng. In his dissent, Justice Brennan described just how
devastating the Lyng decision will be for future Indian free exercise
claims on public lands:
Having thus stripped respondents and all other Native Americans
of any constitutional protection against perhaps the most serious
threat to their age-old religious practices, and indeed to their
entire way of life, the Court assures us that nothing in its
decision "should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity
to the religious needs of any citizen." I find it difficult, however,
to imagine conduct more insensitive to religious needs than the
Government's determination to build a marginally useful road
in the face of uncontradicted evidence that the road
will render
43
the practice of respondents' religion impossible.'
While the majority in Lyng appeared to stay within the established
bounds of free exercise precedents such as Yoder, the Court took
that analysis and extrapolated from it even more than the lower
courts which developed the centrality standard. By relying on coercive
government activity and describing sheltered internal government
affairs, the Court in Lyng has greatly curtailed the reach of the
free exercise clause. By replacing the centrality standard with these
new elements, the Court in Lyng has erected the highest threshold
barrier yet for free exercise claimants to overcome before their
religious practices receive full constitutional protection.
The Court in Lyng seems to have relied on policy arguments that
supported its decision to heighten the threshold requirement of showing a burden on religious practices. By creating a more stringent
burden requirement so that plaintiffs with free exercise claims must
show not only that their own religious practices are threatened by

143. Id.
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government activity but also that the government activity is noninternal and coercive, the court restricts the basis upon which free
exercise claims can be litigated successfully. Most importantly, the
Court in Lyng shows its preference for protecting government property rights at the cost of limiting the first amendment rights of
Indian free exercise litigants.
For Indian litigants, frustration does not come as a new feeling.
A quotation from an Indian points out misunderstandings that may
rest at the very heart of decisions such as Lyng. A man named
Tatanga Mani, or Walking Buffalo, once said these words which,
unfortunately, still apply today:
We were lawless people, but we were on pretty good terms with
the Great Spirit, creator and ruler of all. You whites assumed
we were savages. You didn't understand our prayers. You didn't
try to understand. When we sang our praises to the sun or moon
or wind, you said we were worshipping idols. Without understanding, you condemned us as lost souls just because our form
of worship was different from yours.
We saw the Great Spirit's work in almost everything: sun, moon,
trees, wind and mountains. Sometimes we approached him through
these things. Was that so bad? I think we have a true belief
in the supreme being, a stronger faith than that of most whites
who have called us pagans .

.

.

. Indians living close to nature

and nature's ruler are not living in darkness.
Did you know that trees talk? Well, they do. They talk to each
other, and they'll talk to you if you listen. Trouble is, white
people don't listen. They never learned to listen to the Indians
so I don't suppose they'll listen to other voices in nature. But
I have learned a lot from trees: sometimes about the weather,
sometimes about animals, sometimes about the Great Spirit.'"
The Supreme Court had a chance to listen and learn in Lyng.
But instead of listening to what the high country meant to the
Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa, it listened to government concerns.
Instead of listening to the plea for human rights, the Court heard
the government's concern about property rights. For the sake of
preserving government property rights over Indians' human rights,
the first amendment has become a weaker protection for religious
practices, and another Native American religious practice has come
to an end.
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